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et al.: Recent Decisions

LEGAL SHORTS

RECENT DECISIONS AFFECTING
THE MONTANA PRACTITIONER
i.

PETIERSON V. EICHHORN'

In Peteryon, v. Eic/hhorn, the Montana Supreme Court declined to
adopt Section 509 of the Resiatcment (Seconl) of Torts, which states that

strict liability follows an animal with dangerous propensities abnormal to its
class; although the Court intimated that it might, at some point in the future,
be willing to adopt this section. 2 Under a separate claim, the Court ruled
the clear language of Montana Code Annotated Sections 81-4-215 and
8-4-308(1) only allowed liability to follow animals which had actually broken into or wrongfully entered another's property; liability would not follow non-escaping animals.
The Petersons and the Bastas lived on adjacent properties, divided by a
fence) Eichhorn pastured ten horses on the Basta's property. 4 In 2002,
two or three of Eichhorn's horses broke through the fence and entered the
Petcrsons' property.- Afker securing the fence, the Petersons led the horses
back to the Basta property.' On their way to inform the Bastas of the situation, the Petersons threw some hay to the horses on the Basta property,
hoping to keep the horses away from the damaged fence. 7 After informing
the Bastas of the incident, the Petersons again threw hay to the horses to
keep them away from the fence. The horses included both the horses
which had escaped onto the Peterson property and other horses which had
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Peteryon v. I,'ichlorn,

189 P.3d 615 (Mont. 2008).

Id.
Id. at 617.
i. at 618.
It.
hi.
Peterson, 189 P.3d at 618.

8. Id.
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not escaped. 9 While throwing the hay, Hannah, a mare owned by Eichhorn,
reached over the fence and bit Derinda Peterson. 10 Hannah had not been
among the horses which had escaped onto the Peterson's property.1 1
Peterson filed suit against Eichhorn, asserting claims of strict liability
for an abnormally dangerous domestic animal, negligence, and punitive
damages. 12 Peterson filed to recover medical damages relating to the horse
bite, but she did not file damages relating to the fence breakage (e.g. expenses for repairing the fence). 13 Peterson alleged Eichhorn was strictly
liable for damages from the bite because he owned a domestic animal with
an abnormally dangerous tendency to bite people. 14 Since Eichhorn knew
or should have known of Hannah's abnormal tendency, Peterson argued
15
that Eichhorn was strictly liable for Peterson's injuries.
Peterson presented two negligence theories. 16 First, she alleged
Eichhorn was strictly liable for all injuries resulting from the fence breakage under Montana Code Annotated Sections 81-4-215 and 8-4-301(1) (a
i7
negligence statute), including Hannah's subsequent biting of Peterson.
Second, Peterson alleged Eichhorn negligently breached a legal duty of ordinary care in the management of his horses. 18 Peterson contended that
Eichhorn had caused Peterson's injuries by failing to take reasonable measures to protect others from foreseeable injuries. 19 Finally, Peterson asserted that she was entitled to punitive damages. 20 The district court
21
granted summary judgment to Eichhorn on all issues.
The Court held that Section 509 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
imposing strict liability on owners of abnormally dangerous domestic animals was not applicable to this case because Peterson had failed to prove
that Hannah was abnormally dangerous.2 2 Peterson argued that Hannah's
tendency to bite was a dangerous propensity unusual to mares and urged the
Court to adopt Section 509 of the Restatement.23 The Section 509 provides:
(1) A possessor of a domestic animal that he knows or has reason to know has
dangerous propensities abnormal to its class, is subject to liability for harm
9. Id.

10. Id.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id.
Id.at 618-619.
Peterson, 189 P.3d at 618-619.
Id.

15. Id. at 618.
16. Id.at 621-622.
17. Id.at 621.

18. Id. at 622.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Peterson, 189 P.3d at 622.
Id. at 618.
Id. at 618-619.
Id. at 620.
Id. at 619.
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done by the animal to another, although he has exercised the utmost care to
prevent it from doing the harm.
(2) This liability is limited to harm that results from the abnormally dangerous
24
propensity of which the possessor knows or has reason to know.
In response, Eichhorn argued Section 509 was inapplicable because
Montana had not adopted it.25 Justice Nelson, writing for a unanimous
Court, agreed that Montana had not adopted Section 509, but that Montana
had "adopted other sections of the Restatement ....

."

Thus, it appeared the

Court might be inclined to adopt Section 509, given its approval of other
sections. However, the Court ultimately determined "that this [was] not an
appropriate case in which to consider and adopt Section 509."26 The Court
declined to adopt Section 509 because Peterson had failed to provide any
evidence or legal authority that Hannah's tendency to bite was a dangerous
propensity, that biting was abnormal to mares (her class), or that Eichhorn
knew Hannah had a dangerous propensity for biting and had bitten people
in the past. 27 While Peterson stated it was "unusual for a mare to bite," the
Court noted that, under Section 509, "unusual" and "abnormal" are not necessarily the same. 2 8 The Court reasoned that there are different levels of
biting-whereas biting may be normal for a class, there may also be an
abnormal tendency to bite within the class. 29 Comment f of Section 509
provides:
There are certain classes of domestic animals in which dangerous propensities
are normal although abnormal in other classes of their species. Bulls are
more dangerous than cows and steers

. .

. Certain kinds of livestock are less

gentle than others. Burma cattle are more wild and dangerous than most other
breeds. However, since Burma cattle have been recognized as socially desira30
ble animals, this .. .is not enough to make them abnormally dangerous.

Thus, for instance, all mares may have a tendency to bite. But only a mare
with a tendency to bite that rises to the level of abnormality, thus distinguishing her from other animals of her class, will be held liable under Section 509. Because Peterson had failed to provide any evidence that Hannah
had an abnormal or dangerous propensity to bite, the Court ruled there was
24. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 509 (1977).
25. Peterson, 189 P.3d at 619-620.
26. Id. at 620. See Sunburst Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Texaco, Inc., 165 P.3d 1079 (Mont. 2007) (adopting
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 929 and cmt. b); Crisafulli v. Bass, 38 P.3d 842 (Mont. 2001) (adopting
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 316); First Bank (N.A.)-Billings v. Clark, 771 P.2d 84 (Mont. 1989)
(adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, cmt. j); Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A.,
Inc., 513 P.2d 268 (Mont. 1973) (adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A).
27. Peterson, 189 P.3d at 620.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 509 cmt. f.
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no issue of material fact and affirmed the district court's ruling in favor of
3
Eichhorn. '
The Court held Eichhorn was not negligent under the two theories of
negligence presented by Peterson. 32 First, Peterson contended Eichhorn
was strictly liable for any foreseeable injuries resulting from the horses
breaking through the fence. 3 3 Eichhorn cited Montana Code Annotated
Section 81-4-215 which provides, "If any . ..horses . . .break into any
enclosure ... the owner of the animals is liable for damages to the owner or
occupant of the enclosure if the owner or person in control of the animals
was negligent." 34 Peterson further cited Section 81-4-307(1): "If an
animal ... wrongfully enters the premises of a person within a herd district,
the owner or person in control of the animal is liable for ... any damages
caused by the animal."' 35 Peterson argued that the horses' fence breakage
triggered liability for Hannah's subsequent bite of Peterson. The Court disagreed, holding that damages would only follow the horses which had actually escaped the pasture, and Hannah had not been one of those horses. 36
At the time the bite had occurred, the Petersons had already secured and fed
the escaped horses. 37 The Court further noted that no damages from the
fence breakage had been pled; rather, only damages from the horse bite had
been pled. 38 Because the clear language of the statute referred to animals
which had broken into or wrongfully entered another's property, liability
would only extend to damages caused by those escaping animals. 39
Under a second theory of negligence, Peterson asserted that Eichhorn
negligently breached a duty of ordinary care regarding the management of
his horses. 40 The district court found that because Peterson had been contributorily negligent by feeding not only the horses which had escaped but
the other horses on Basta's land, Eichhorn was relieved of liability. 4 1 The
Court reiterated that comparative negligence had replaced the old rule of
contributory negligence in Montana. 42 Under current Montana law, "recovery is barred only if the plaintiff is found to be greater than 50 percent
31. Peterson, 189 P.3d at 620.
32. Id. at 621-622, 624.
33. Id. at 621.
34. Peterson, 189 P.3d at 621; Mont. Code Ann. § 81-4-215 (2003).
35. Peterson, 189 P.3d at 621; Mont. Code Ann. § 81-4-307(1).
36. Peterson, 189 P.3d at 618, 621.
37. Id. at 621 (noting that the bite only occurred when the Petersons attempted to feed the horses a
second time).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 622.
41. Id.
42. Peterson, 189 P.3d at 622.
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negligent." 43 However, the Court held that, while Eichhorn could not be
relieved of legal liability due to Peterson's negligence, Peterson did not
present substantial evidence to show Eichhorn had breached his duty of
ordinary care by keeping Hannah in the corral; thus, the Court affirmed
44
summary judgment for Eichhorn.
The Court declared that its other holdings rendered punitive damages
in favor of Eichhorn moot, and it affirmed the district court's ruling on
45
summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages in favor of Eichhorn.
Given the unanimous opinion's subtle signals regarding § 509 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, practitioners should note that Montana may
adopt § 509 in the near future. Because a close reading of § 509 distinguishes many classes of domestic animals, this is an appropriate section for
Montana to adopt. Preferably, the Montana legislature will consider and
adopt this section, pre-empting any need for common law adoption.
Clearly, mature stallions being kept for stud will have much different
propensities than mature geldings or colts. Comment f of § 509 provides,
"There is no social value in keeping animals that are vicious or have other
dangerous propensities that are in excess of those necessary for their utility
and are abnormal to their class."'46 But there is social value in keeping
useful animals that may have dangerous propensities normal to their class.
Thus, the wording of § 509 is important in an agricultural state such as
Montana, for it assumes that a South Devon heifer does not necessarily
have the same propensities as a Black Angus heifer. Whether arguing for or
against the adoption of § 509, practitioners must be aware of the various
classes of domestic animals and their propensities. Only by establishing
baseline propensities based on gender, breed, and age will a practitioner be
able to adequately distinguish an animal that is abnormal from the rest of its
class.
-K. V. Aldrich
I.

MICHALAK v. LIBERTY

N. W.

INS. CO.

47

The Montana Supreme Court recently held that an employee injured
while riding a wave runner at his employer's company picnic acted within
the course and scope of his employment and was, therefore, entitled to
48
workers' compensation benefits.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 624.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 509 cmt. f.
Michalak v. Liberty N.W. Ins. Co., 175 P.3d 893, 899 (Mont. 2008).
Id.
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In July 2005, Plaintiff Curtis Michalak attended a company picnic
hosted by his employer, Felco, and Felco's president, John Felton. 49 Since
1980, Felton had hosted annual company picnics at his home. 50 Felco traditionally informed its employees of the date of the picnic by posting notices
around the business and by inserting notices into the employees' pay
stubs. 5 ' At the July, 2005 picnic, Michalak's supervisor asked Michalak to
oversee the operation of the wave runners. 5 2 Michalak's responsibilities
included "providing riders with safety instructions, monitoring the wave
runners' fuel and oil levels, instructing others on how to ride the wave runners, and enforcing the time limits on the wave runners' use."' 53 While fulfilling these responsibilities, Michalak rode one of the wave runners and
54
crashed, sustaining serious injuries, including several vertebrae fractures.
The Workers' Compensation Act, codified at Montana Code Annotated Sections 39-71-101 et seq., provides that an "insurer is liable for the
payment of compensation, in the manner and to the extent provided in this
section, to an employee of an employer ... who receives an injury arising
55
out of and in the course of employment."
Under the 2005 Workers' Compensation Act, effective at the time of
Michalak's injury, the definition of "employee" excluded a person "participating in a recreational activity and who at the time is relieved of and is not
56
performing prescribed duties."
To determine whether the employee was injured within the course of
employment, the Montana Supreme Court applied the four-factor test set
out in Courser v. Darby School District. No. 1.57 The factors are:
(1) whether the activity was undertaken at the employer's request;
(2) whether the employer, directly or indirectly, compelled the employee's
attendance at the activity;
(3) whether the employer controlled or participated in the activity; and (4)
whether the employer and the employee mutually benefited from the activity.

58

49. Id. at 894.
50. Id.

51. Id. at 894-895.
52. Id. at 896.

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
1984)).
58.

Michalak, 175 P.3d at 895.
Id.
Mont. Code Ann. § 39-71-407(1) (2007).
Id. at § 39-71-118(2)(a) (2005).
Michalak, 175 P.3d at 895 (citing Courser v. Darby Sch. Dist. No. 1, 692 P.2d 417, 419 (Mont.
Id. (citing Connery v. Liberty Northwest Ins. Corp., 929 P.2d 222, 225 (Mont. 1996)).
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The Court further pointed out that the factors "may or may not be
determinative, and each factor's significance must be considered in the to' 59
tality of all attendant circumstances.
The Michalak Court broadly interpreted the term "activity" contemplated in the four-factor test. The Court found:
In Courser, we determined that Courser was within the course and scope of
his employment when he was injured in a motorcycle accident while commuting from graduate school to his home in Dillon, Montana. We applied the
four factor 'course and scope' analysis and focused on the activity of attend60
ing graduate school, not the motorcycle ride.
Applying the Coursertest, the Montana Workers' Compensation Court
(WCC) determined that these facts satisfied all factors of the test, and therefore agreed that Michalak injury occurred within the course and scope of
62
his employment. 6 1 The Montana Supreme Court agreed.
Regarding the first factor, the Montana Supreme Court considered several case-specific facts. The picnic had been a yearly tradition at Felco
since 1980. Felco and its president, Felton, always paid all the costs of the
picnic. Felton traditionally chose the date of the picnic. Felco provided
paddle boats and wave runners to entertain the employees. Lastly, Felco
notified employees of the picnic with announcements posted throughout the
63
plant and with notices placed in their pay stubs.
The second factor-whether Felco or Felton had compelled
Michalak's attendance-was also satisfied. 64 The Court concluded that
Michalak felt induced to attend because of his supervisor's request that
Michalak direct the operation of the wave runners. Michalak testified that,
when his supervisor asked him to oversee the wave runners, he understood
that the supervisor made this request in a managerial capacity, rather than as
a personal request. Michalak prepared for his supervision of the wave run65
ners by acquiring and reviewing a copy of Montana boating regulations.
Michalak also felt compelled to attend the picnic "so that he could fulfill his
66
obligation and respect his employer."
The Court held that the third factor was satisfied as well, concluding
that Felco "controlled and participated" 6 in the company party. The Court
noted that Felco paid for the costs of the picnic. Indeed, Felco's policy
59. Id. (citing Connery, 929 P.2d at 226) (internal quotations omitted).
60. Id. at 897 (citing Courser, 692 P.2d at 419).
61, Id. at 899.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Michalak, 175 P.3d at 896.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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restricted employees from bringing anything to the picnic. The Court also
considered that Felton held the annual picnic at his home and received an
68
annual tax deduction for the picnic costs.
Lastly, the fourth factor-whether the employer and the employee mutually benefited from the activity-was satisfied because of extensive testimony that the "company picnics were good for the company and that the
picnic promoted good relations." 6 9 The WCC concluded that both Felco
and Felco's employees "mutually benefited" from the company picnic, in
70
part because it allowed employees to gather together with their families.
The Montana Supreme Court agreed.
Liberty argued that these facts did not satisfy the Courser test, and
therefore Michalak's injury did not occur within the course and scope of his
employment. 7 1 The Court determined that Liberty's argument relied mistakenly on the assumption that the "activity" contemplated in the Courseranalysis was Michalak's ride on the wave runner, rather than the picnic as a
whole. 72 Following Courser, where the analysis focused on the broader
"activity of attending graduate school, not the motorcycle ride," 7 3 the Court
concluded that the appropriate interpretation of "activity" in this context
74
was the picnic as a whole, as opposed to the wave runner ride.
Liberty next contended that the Court should overrule Courser because
the factors were based on the "liberal construction" statute, Montana Code
Annotated Section 39-71-104 (1985), since repealed by the Montana Legislature. 75 Instead, Montana Code Annotated Section 39-371-105(5)
(2005),76 like the current 2007 statute, directed that the Workers' Compensation Act "must be construed according to its terms and not liberally in
favor of any party."' 77 Liberty argued that the Courser test defies this legislative directive by liberally construing the Act.
The Court disagreed, pointing out that the Courser test focuses on the
factors a court should analyze to determine if an employee's injury occurred
within the course and scope of employment, while the Legislature's directive instructs how courts should interpret the Workers' Compensation
Act. 78 The Courser factors and the statutory directives thus address two
68. Id.
69. Michalak, 175 P.3d at 896.
70. Id.
71. Id.at 897.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Michalak, 175 P.3d at 897.
76. Mont. Code Ann. § 39-71-105(5) (2005).
77. Id. at § 39-71-105(5) (2007).
78. Michalak, 175 P.3d at 897.
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different concerns and, therefore, can be applied in conjunction with one
79
another. The factors and the directive "are not mutually exclusive."
Liberty also asserted that applying the Courserfactors to determine the
meaning of "prescribed duties"-contained in the definition of "employee"
at Montana Code Annotated Section 39-71-118(2)(a) (2005)-amounted
to "judicial abracadabra." 80 The Court disagreed, stating that the term was
deliberately left undefined because the definition of the term depends on the
specific facts of each case. 81 The Court explained the four-factor Courser
test provides an appropriate analysis of those facts.
Finally, the Court dismissed Liberty's last argument that Michalak operated the wave runner recklessly when he was injured and that he thus
abandoned his employment. 82 The Court found that the WCC made no
83
findings concerning Michalak's operation of the wave runner.
The Court ultimately affirmed the WCC's judgment, concluding that
Michalak's injury occurred within the course and scope of his employment,
84
and relying on the satisfaction of the four-factor Courser test.
Although the Court did not address Montana's current public policy
statute, that policy lends support for the Court's decision. The Montana
Workers' Compensation statute provides:
An objective of the Montana workers' compensation system is to provide,
without regard to fault, wage-loss and medical benefits to a worker suffering
from a work-related injury or disease. Wage-loss benefits are not intended to
but are intended to assist a worker at a reasonmake an injured worker whole
85
able cost to the employer.
86
The 2005 Workers' Compensation Act provided the same policy.
Additionally, the burden rests on the employer or workers' compensation
insurer to prove that an employee acted outside the course and scope of his
employment when he sustained the injury. 8 7 Here, the Court's decision
comports with Montana's public policy, especially where Liberty carried
the burden, and failed to meet it.

-Kari Cluff
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 897-898.
83. Michalak, 175 P.3d at 898.

84. Id. at 897, 899.
85. Mont. Code Ann. § 39-71-105(1) (2007).
86. Mont. Code Ann. § 39-71-105(1) (2005).
87. Van Vleet v. Mont. Assn. of Cos. Workers' Comp. Trust, 103 P.3d 544, 549 (Mont. 2004).
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IN THE MATTER OF B.A.M. 8 8

Even though a state actor unconstitutionally conducts a warrantless
search, a Montana court will not suppress a defendant's use of violence
89
after the search under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine.
On November 5, 2006, B.A.M., a minor, was arrested and charged
with assault, obstructing a peace officer, resisting arrest, disorderly conduct,
and a minor in possession of alcohol (MIP). 9 °
Earlier that evening, Fergus County sheriff deputies were alerted to an
underage drinking party at a ranch about 25 miles outside of Lewistown. 9 1
Upon arrival the deputies observed "several seemingly underage people in92
side the house and a large quantity of liquor bottles and beer cans."
The partygoers noticed the deputies outside the home and "began rushing around the house, attempting to hide the beverage containers." 93 Some
'94
of them began running out of the house "into the darkness.
The deputies demanded to speak to the homeowner but received no
response. 95 The deputies then called in their observations, discussed the
possibility of obtaining a telephonic warrant to search the house, and ultimately decided to enter the home without obtaining a warrant. 9 6 The deputies apprehended approximately 15 minors, including B.A.M. 9 7
As the deputies gathered the minors outside the home and began to
issue MIP tickets, B.A.M. refused to stand with the others. 98 Instead,
B.A.M. returned to the house shouting that "if he was going to get a ticket,
he was going to be drunk." 99 The deputies observed B.A.M. "grabbing
every bottle he could find.., and chugging." 100 B.A.M. reportedly resisted
arrest by fighting and injuring one of the deputies on the scene. 10 1
B.A.M. moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that the deputies conducted an unconstitutional warrantless search of the house.' 0 2 Specifically, B.A.M. argued exigent circumstances did not exist to justify the
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

In re B.A.M., 192 P.3d 1161 (Mont. 2008).
Id. at 1165.
Id. at 1162.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re B.A.M., 192 P.3d at 1162.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re B.A.M., 192 P.3d at 1162.
Id.
Id.
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warrantless search, and-absent a valid search-the State "legally could
10 3
not sustain any of the charges against him."'
The Youth Court denied the motion, finding that exigent circumstances did exist.' 0 4 The Youth Court reasoned that the deputies first "observed the underage drinkers before entering the house" and then watched
them flee as they approached the house. Second, the location of the house
"was remote and the weather was cold." 10 5 Thus, in order to preserve injury and to protect the minors from injury, the Youth Court reasoned that
exigent circumstances justified the deputies' warrantless search of the
home.' 0 6 B.A.M. pleaded "true" to all charges but reserved his right to
07
appeal the evidentiary question.'
B.A.M.'s issue on appeal is whether exigent circumstances existed to
justify the warrantless search. 10 8 The Supreme Court, however, refused to
address the Fourth Amendment violation and instead resolved the issue of
whether or not the evidence was admissible based on one of the established
exceptions to the exclusionary rule. 10 9
Evidence obtained from an unconstitutional search or seizure under the
Fourth Amendment constitutes "fruit of the poisonous tree" and is excluded. 110 However, Montana recognizes the following three exceptions to
the doctrine: if the evidence is "(1) attenuated from the constitutional violation so as to remove its primary taint; (2) obtained from an independent
source; or (3) determined to be evidence which would have been inevitably
discovered apart from the constitutional violation." 1 1
Evidence is "sufficiently attenuated from the alleged constitutional violation" when a separate offense is committed in response to illegal search
and seizure.1 12 In Montana v. Rookhuizen, two bail agents illegally entered
into the defendant's girlfriend's house. 1 3 The defendant threatened the bail
agents with a gun and fled.' 1 4 The State charged the defendant with assault
and the defendant moved to suppress the evidence because the agents entered his home illegally. 1 5 The Court denied the motion, reasoning the
criminal conduct committed in response to the improper search was so "at103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.
Id.
In re B.A.M., 192 P.3d at 1162.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 1162-1163.
Mont. v. Therriault, 14 P.3d 444, 454 (Mont. 2000).
Id. (citing Mont. v. New, 817 P.2d 919, 923 (Mont. 1996)).
In re B.A.M., 192 P.3d at 1163.
Id. (citing Mont. v. Rookhuizen, 172 P.3d 1257, 1258 (Mont. 2007)).
Id. (citing Rookhuizen, 172 P.3d at 1258).
Id. (citing Rookhuizen, 172 P.3d at 1258).
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tenuated from the claimed improper search or stop that it los[es] its primary
constitutional taint ...and that the evidence is, therefore, not subject to the
exclusionary rule."'1 16 Furthermore, the Court held the "failure to exclude
such evidence could have the unwanted effect of encouraging violence to' 17
ward state actors in response to illegal stops and searches." "
The Court also relied on Montana v. Courville.118 In Courville, the
defendant severely injured a police officer who illegally stopped the defendant because he lacked particularized suspicion.' 19 The Court held "the
exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence of criminal conduct committed
20
in response to a claimed Fourth Amendment violation."'
Similarly, in Montana v. Ottwell the defendant was charged with assault when she threatened two officers with a weapon after the officers entered her motel room without a warrant.' 2 1 The Ottwell Court found "such
evidence does not constitute the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' and thus the
purpose of the exclusionary rule-to protect a person from unreasonable
searches and seizures through suppression of evidence-would not be ac122
complished by its application in such a situation."
Here, B.A.M.'s actions "likewise constituted criminal conduct committed in response to an alleged Fourth Amendment violation."' 123 As in
Rookhuizen, Courville, and Ottwell, all of B.A.M.'s actions occurred in the
24
deputies' presence-after the alleged violation took place.'
B.A.M. attempted to distinguish the nature of his actions from those in
Rookhuizen, Courville, and Ottwell.12 5 He argued that the "lack of specificity in the record regarding his violent conduct precludes" the analogy of the
mentioned case law. 126 The Court dismissed this argument because B.A.M.
neither cited authority nor denied committing violence toward a state actor.127 Further, the Court refused to distinguish the application of the exception to the exclusionary rule based on the "degree or nature of the violent conduct."' 2 8 The Court concluded that the policy behind the cases is to
116. Id. (citing Rookhuizen, 172 P.3d at 1259-1260).
117. Id. (citing Rookhuizen, 172 P.3d at 1259).
118. In re B.A.M., 192 P.3d at 1163 (citing Mont. v. Courville, 61 P.3d 749 (Mont. 2002)).
119. Id. (citing Courville, 61 P.3d at 752).
120. Id. (citing Courville, 61 P.3d at 754).
121. Id. (citing Mont. v. Ottwell, 779 P.2d 500, 502 (Mont. 1989)).
122. Id. (citing Ottwell, 779 P.2d at 502).
123. Id.at 1163-1164.
124. In re B.A.M., 192 P.3d at 1164.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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discourage all violence against state actors, not to "allow certain kinds of
129
violence, but not others."'
In conclusion, any violence, regardless of degree, committed toward a
state actor after an illegal search or seizure in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, falls under a clearly established exception to the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine-the evidence is so removed from the constitu130
tional violation so as to remove its primary taint.
-Annie

DeWolf
IV.

MONTANA

V. ROSLING

13 1

In Montana v. Rosling, the Montana Supreme Court extended the
scope of aggravated kidnapping to include the movement of a victim within
her home during a deliberate homicide. The Court upheld the restraint element of aggravated kidnapping because evidence demonstrated that Rosling
attacked his victim in the bedroom before ultimately stabbing her to death
1 32
in the bathroom.
After a night of partying in Helena, Jared Rosling drove Jessica
Dooley to her vehicle at the Valley Hub bar and then stopped at her
house. 133 One of Dooley's neighbors witnessed a car being parked at 6:00
a.m., identified the car as Rosling's, and testified that she saw Rosling
134
quickly leave Dooley's home around 8:00 a.m.
Between 8:35 a.m. and 11:15 a.m. that morning, Rosling purchased
several items from Wal-Mart, Target and Shopko. 135 Rosling then met
friends to ski at the Great Divide Ski Area.' 3 6 One friend broached the
subject of Dooley's murder, but Rosling refused to discuss it, indicating that
the prior night he had left Dooley at the Valley Hub bar and then slept in his
37
car for a couple of hours. 1
Jessica's father, Richard Dooley, arrived at his daughter's home at
about 8:00 a.m. and smelled smoke upon entering. 13 8 He found Jessica's
naked body on her bathroom floor, 139 with a plastic bag fastened around her
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
In re B.A.M., 192 P.3d at 1165.
Mont. v. Rosling, 180 P.3d 1102 (Mont. 2008).
Id.at 1114-1115.
Id.
Id.at 1106-1107.
Id.
Id.
Rosling, 180 P.3d at 1106-1107.
Id.at 1105.
Id.
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head and burning magazines underneath her legs. 140 It appeared that
Dooley had been strangled in her bedroom, possibly causing her to defecate, and then stabbed multiple times in her bathroom. 14 1 Investigators
found hardly any blood in the bedroom, but found fecal matter on the bed
and on a piece of clothing. 142 In the bathroom, blood stained the bathroom
walls, countertop, sink, and around the bathtub. 143 Soiled shorts belonging
144
to Dooley soaked in the sink.
Dooley's autopsy showed evidence of strangulation or neck compression before her death. During the trial, the medical examiner testified that it
is "not uncommon" for people to defecate while being strangled. 145 The
pathologist testified that strangulation was not the cause of Jessica's death;
her death was caused by 67 stab wounds and 28 cutting wounds, some of
which appeared to be defensive wounds. This indicated that she was still
146
alive and resisting during the stabbing.
The day after the incident, officers arrested Rosling. Rosling was
charged with deliberate homicide, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, tampering with or fabricating physical evidence, and criminal possession of dangerous drugs. 147 During the trial, the district court questioned
the prosecutor on the aggravated kidnapping charge.148 The prosecutor responded that the movement of Jessica by force from her bedroom to the
bathroom satisfied kidnapping and that her bathroom qualified as "a place
of isolation" as required by statute. 149 The prosecutor also offered three
theories on the statutory restraint requirement: Jessica's killer restrained her
while strangling her; he restrained her by forcing her into the bathroom; and
he restrained her by the terrorizing effect of the non-fatal stab wounds.' 50
A jury convicted Rosling on all charges. On appeal, Rosling challenged a number of the district court's decisions, but most importantly, that
the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss all the charges for
insufficient evidence. 15 ' The Montana Supreme Court focused on this is152
sue, and found sufficient evidence to find Rosling guilty on all counts.
In so holding, the Court paid particular attention to the aggravated kidnap140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Rosling, 180 P.3d at 1105.
Id.
Id. at 1106.
Id.
Id. at 1105.
Id. at 1109.
Rosling, 180 P.3d at 1109.
Id.
Id.at 1118.
Id.at 1113-1115.
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ping conviction. Aggravated kidnapping is governed by Montana Code Annotated Section 45-5-503(1):
[a] person commits the offense of aggravated kidnapping if the person knowingly and purposely and without lawful authority restrains another person by
either secreting or holding the other person in a place of isolation or by using
or threatening to use physical force, with any of the following purposes
153
(c) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another.

Rosling argued the State failed to prove restraint either in a place of isolation or by using or threatening physical force. 154 The Court, unconvinced
by Rosling's argument, held that the jury properly exercised its discretion in
55
accepting the State's interpretation of the evidence.1
Rosling additionally argued that stabbing Dooley did not satisfy the
restraint element because any restraint was incidental to the act of homicide. 156 Rosling cited cases in surrounding jurisdictions holding that kidnapping statutes do not apply to incidental movements during the commission of another felony.1 57 Rosling argued that adopting a broad interpretation would allow every intentional homicide to also be charged as an
aggravated kidnapping. 158 The Court disagreed, stating that evidence in
this case supported "entirely distinct" charges. 159 Thus, the evidence was
sufficient to satisfy the elements of aggravated kidnapping, independently
60
of deliberate homicide.1
Justice Warner, joined by Justices Morris and Cotter, dissented from
the Court's holding on the aggravated kidnapping conviction. 61 The dissent was concerned with the extension of the scope of aggravated kidnap1 62
ping such that "almost every murder could justify a kidnapping charge."'
While agreeing that the offense committed by Rosling was horrific, the dissent found no evidence that moving Dooley within the house had "any purpose other than to complete the act of deliberate homicide."' 163 The movement between the two rooms was simply part of the attack that led to her
death, and thus was incidental to her homicide. 164 The dissent would have
preferred to hold that movement of the victim incidental to the commission
153. Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-503(1) (2007).
154. Rosling, 180 P.3d at 1113.

155. Id. at 1106.
156. Id.
157. Id. (citing Md. v. Stouffer, 721 A.2d 207, 212 (Md. 1998); Vt. v. Goodhue, 833 A.2d 861,
864-865 (Vt. 2003); Hoyt v. Commonwealth, 605 S.E.2d 755, 757 (Va. App. 2004); Tenn. v. Fuller, 172
S.W.3d 533, 536-538 (Tenn. 2005)).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Rosling, 180 P.3d at 1115.
161. Id. at 1119.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1120.
164. Id.
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of another crime fails to satisfy the requirements of aggravated kidnap-

ping. 165
Montana criminal law attorneys should be aware of the Court's extension of the aggravated kidnapping statute in Rosling. Many homicides occur within the victim's home and involve some movement during the attack. Thus, as the dissent and Rosling point out, this extension could result
in a significant increase in the amount of aggravated kidnapping charges
and convictions. Attorneys representing defendants charged with homicide,
and possibly other violent crimes, must be particularly aware of the Court's
broad interpretation of the restraint element of aggravated kidnapping-particularly where there has been a struggle within the victim's home.
-Katy

Furlong
16 6

MORDJA V. MONTANA ELEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

V.

In Mordja v. Montana Eleventh Judicial District Court, the Montana
Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant is subject to a statutory
amendment extending the period of limitations for an offense, so long as the
offense was not barred at the time of amendment.' 67 The Court's determination turned on whether extending a statute of limitations was a "retroactive" law and would thus have to comply with Montana Code Annotated
Section 1-2-109.168 Although at first glance the Court appears to scale
back on the repose that a statute of limitation is supposed to confer upon a
prospective defendant, the Court provides a well reasoned analysis as to
why it is a different case when the statute of limitations in question has not
yet run.
On January 29, 2007, the state charged Keith Mordja with one count of
sexual intercourse without consent.16 9 Between 1994 and 2000, Mordja had
allegedly engaged in the continual rape of a minor.17 0 The victim did not
reach the age of 18 until March 25, 2001.171 At the time of the alleged
rape, Montana law provided that, if the victim was a minor, a prosecution
could be effected any time within a five-year window after the minor
reached the age of 18.172 In 2001, the Legislature amended Montana Code
Annotated Section 45-1-205, extending the limitations period for prosecu165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id.
Mordja v. Mont. Eleventh Jud. Dist. Ct., 177 P.3d 439 (Mont. 2008).
Id. at 443.
Id. at 442.
Id. at 440.
Id. at 440; Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-503 (2005).
Mordja, 177 P.3d at 440.
Mordja, 177 P.3d at 440; Mont. Code Ann. § 45-1-205(1)(b) (1999).
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tions to ten years. 173 At the time that the prosecution was initiated, five
years and ten months had elapsed from the date of the victim's 18th birthday. 174
Mordja moved for dismissal, arguing that he was subject to the fiveyear statute of limitations in effect prior to the 2001 amendment, and his
prosecution was time-barred. 17 5 The district court determined that Mordja
was subject to the 10-year statute of limitations under Montana Code Annotated Section 45-1-205, and thus denied the motion. 176 The district court
reasoned that an amended statute of limitations was a procedural change
which did not implicate any ex post facto issues. 177 Mordja then petitioned
t 78
the Montana Supreme Court for a writ of supervisory control.
Mordja argued his case was distinguishable from previous case law
which had held amended statutes of limitation to be retroactively applicable.17 9 The critical difference, Mordja argued, was that the 2001 extension
of the statute of limitation had not complied with the statutory requirement
that the Legislature expressly declare its intent to make the law retroactively
applicable under Montana Code Annotated Section 1-2-109.180 The 2001
amendment was not accompanied by any legislative pronouncement that the
new statute of limitations was to be retroactive.' 8' Both parties concentrated on whether the express retroactive intent applied to both substantive
and procedural laws or solely to substantive ones. 182 Conflicting case law
exists as to whether Montana Code Annotated Section 1-2-109 applies to
both procedural and substantive laws or if it applies only to substantive
laws. 183 Ultimately, the Court refused to answer the substantive versus pro84
cedural question. 1
Instead, the Court's decision turned on whether an extension of a statute of limitations, which was had not run at the time of amendment, was
actually a "retroactive" law under the meaning of Montana Code Annotated
Section 1-2-109.185 Relying on Montana v. Coleman,' 86 the Court determined that, the "retroactive" nature of the extension turned on a two-part
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id.; Mont. Code Ann. § 45-1-205(1)(b) (2001).
Mordja, 177 P.3d at 440.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 441.
Id. at 440.
Id.
Mordja, 177 P.3d at 441; Mont. Code. Ann. § 1-2-109 (2005).
Mordja, 177 P.3d at 441; Mont. Code Ann. § 45-1-205(1)(b) (2001).
Mordja, 177 P.3d at 441-442.
Id. at 441.
Id. at 442.
Id. at 442.
Montana v. Coleman, 605 P.2d 1000 (Mont. 1979).
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inquiry. 187 First, the Court asked whether Mordja, "ha[d] any vested right
in the statute of limitations."1 88 Here, Mordja had a vested interest in the
use of the affirmative defense that accompanies the statute of limitations. 18 9
Second, the Court asked whether the extension of the limitations period
stripped him of that right, or imposed some "new duty, obligation or disadvantage upon him."' 190
In determining that Mordja had no vested right in the statute of limitations, the Court relied on two cases, Cosgriffe v. Cosgriffe' 9 1 and Stogner v.
California, which held together that a defendant's vested rights were not
disturbed by the extension of a statute of limitations. 9 2 The Cosgriffe
Court held that retroactive application of an amended statute of limitations
193
did not necessarily "disturb vested rights."
Since Cosgriffe was a civil case, the Mordja Court looked to Stogner
as well, and examined due process and ex post facto issues that may arise in
a criminal case. 194 First, the Court noted that the Stogner Court differentiated between amendments that would extend expired statutes of limitation,
and amendments that would extend limitations periods that were still
open.19 5 While those amendments that extended an expired limitations period ran afoul of the ex post facto clause, those that simply extended an
open limitations period did not. 19 6 Second, the Court added Stogner had
been interpreted to include, "a defendant has no vested right in a statute of
limitations until it expires, and the prosecution is banned."' 97 With these
considerations, the Court determined that Mordja could not have had a
vested right in the affirmative defense of an expired statute of limitations
198
because the statute had been extended before the period had run.
The Court next turned to the question of whether the extended statute
of limitations imposed some new duty, obligation or disadvantage on
Mordja. 199 Central to the Court's analysis was Montana v. Wright.200 In
Wright, the Court upheld a retroactive extension of an open limitations period because it neither altered the definition of the crime, nor did it increase
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Mordja, 177 P.3d at 442.
Id.
Id. at 443.
Id. at 442.
Cosgriffe v. Cosgriffe, 864 P.2d 776 (Mont. 1993).
Stogner v. Cal., 539 U.S. 607 (2003).
Mordja, 177 P.3d at 442-443 (quoting Cosgriffe, 864 P.2d at 779).
Mordja, 177 P.3d at 443.

195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.

198. Id.
199. Id. at 442, 443.
200. Montana v. Wright, 38 P.3d 772 (Mont. 2001).
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the punishment for that crime. 201 Instead, in Mordja's case, the amendment
merely extended an already open statute of limitations. 20 2 Both the crime
and the punishment set forth in Montana Code Annotated Section
20 3
45-1-205, were exactly the same before and after the 2001 amendment.
Thus, the amendment placed no new duty, obligation or disadvantage upon
Mordja. 204 Therefore, the extended statute of limitations period was not
"retroactive" as defined in Montana Code Annotated Section 1-2-109.205
Mordja demonstrates an attempt by the Court to distinguish when a
defendant can claim a vested right in a statute of limitations. While this
decision may perturb prospective defendants, bear in mind that the repose
that accompanies the expiration of a statute of limitations comes into existence only when the period finally runs out. The statute itself is simply a
time period that gives a probable date of repose-it does not guarantee an
actual date of repose.
More broadly, Montana practitioners should be cautioned that anytime
they seek to label a law "retroactive" under the rule of Montana Code Annotated Section 1-2-109, they will have to provide the initial showing that
a defendant's vested right was extinguished, or that the defendant was burdened with a new duty, obligation or disadvantage. Furthermore, the practitioner should keep in mind that the Court's decision may be somewhat tempered by the criminal nature of Mordja. The analysis suggests that the
Court may exercise further leniency in the context of civil statutes of limitation when due process and ex post facto issues are not involved.
-Andres Haladay

VI.

BILLINGS GAZETTE V. MONTANA

206

In Billings Gazette v. Montana, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed
that the district court did not have jurisdiction to interpret or apply attorney
disciplinary rules.20 7 The Court also stated the principles of due process
prohibit disclosure of disciplinary records when a lawyer tenders an admis-

sion under Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement Rule 26.208
Because the Court only addressed the district court's subject matter
jurisdiction, the Court never addressed the constitutionality of the rules as
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Mordja, 177 P.3d at 443.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Billings Gaz. v. Mont., 190 P.3d 1126 (Mont. 2006).

207. Id. at 1129.
208. Id.
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urged by the Billings Gazette (Gazette). 2°) 9 Rather, the Court discouraged
the Gazette from filing an original claim and re-raising the constitutional
issue. 210 In doing so, the Court side-stepped a ripe opportunity to conduct a
thorough constitutional analysis of Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement Rule
26, thereby leaving this important question unanswered.
In 2003 and 2004, complaints were filed against Billings Deputy City
21
Attorney Moira D'Alton with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC). 1
After a private hearing before the Montana Supreme Court in November
2005, Ms. D'Alton filed a Conditional Admission and Affidavit of Consent
with the Montana Commission on Practice (Commission). 21 2 In 2006, the
Court approved Ms. D'Alton's Admission. 2 13 Consequently, Ms. D'Alton
was publicly censured, her license was suspended for thirty days, and she
was put on probation for two years. 21 4 In its Order, the Supreme Court
revealed the rules of professional conduct that Ms. D'Alton violated but did
21 5
not disclose the specific conduct leading to disciplinary action.
In April 2006, the Gazette requested the public documents from the
ODC pertaining to Ms. D'Alton's disciplinary proceedings. 21 6 The ODC
denied this request, citing Rules 20 and 26 of the Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement Rules. 2 17 The Gazette then requested Ms. D'Alton's file from
the Commission. 2 18 Citing the same rules, the Commission again denied
2 19
the request.
In May 2006, the Gazette filed a Petition to Obtain Public Documents
in district court. 220 The First Judicial District Court held it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction and had no authority to compel the release of Ms.
2 22
D'Alton's file. 22 1 As a result, the Gazette appealed the decision.
In its brief analysis, the Court affirmed its original and exclusive jurisdiction over all attorney disciplinary matters pursuant to Article VII, Section 2(3) of the Montana Constitution. 2 23 Also, the Court declined to affirm
209. Br. of Appellant at 1, Billings Gaz. v. Mont., 190 P.3d 1126 (Mont. 2006).
210. Billings Gaz., 190 P.3d at 1129.
211. Id. at 1128.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Billings Ga., 190 P.3d at 1128.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Billings Ga.., 190 P.3d at 1128.
223. Id.at 1129. The Court also cited the following two cases as authority for its original and
exclusive jurisdiction: Boe v. Ct. Adminstr. Mont. Jud. Branch Personnel Plan & Policies, 150 P.3d 927
(Mont. 2007); Goetz v. Harrison, 457 P.2d 911 (Mont. 1969).
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Ms. D'Alton's file to be "public record[ ]." It reasoned that such a declaration, without prior notice, would violate her due process rights. 2 24 In making this determination, the Court analyzed the same two Rules of Lawyer
Disciplinary Enforcement. Under Rule 20(a), all disciplinary proceedings
prior to the filing of a formal complaint are confidential. 22 5 Furthermore,
all tendered admission proceedings are confidential under Rule 26.226
Contrary to the judiciary's obligation to state "what the law is," this
decision leaves questions unanswered. 2 27 For example, the Court ignored
important issues raised by limiting its holding to a jurisdictional determination. The Court should have invited the Gazette to file an original petition
for Ms. D'Alton's records with the Court. Although the Court determined
Ms. D'Alton's file was not public record, it did so without analyzing several critical issues:
(1) Whether the confidentiality provisions in Rules 20(a) and 26 violate the
"right to know" provision of Article II, Section 9 of the Montana Constitution;

22 8

(2) Whether the OCD and the Commission are "public bodies or agencies"
within the meaning of Article II, Section 9 of the Montana Constitution; 229
(3) How Montana's statutory provisions that classify judicial records as
"public writings" would apply. 2 30
First, the Court should have applied Article II, Section 9 of the Montana Constitution to Rules 20(a) and 26. This section states: "No person
shall be deprived of the right to examine documents or to observe the deliberations of all public bodies or agencies of state government and its subdivisions, except in cases in which the demand of individual privacy clearly
exceeds the merits of public disclosure." 2 3 1 However, the Court never addressed whether Ms. D'Alton's right to privacy exceeded the merits of public disclosure of her file. If indeed this were the case, the Court should have
made this point explicit.
Second, the Court should have ruled that the ODC and Commission
are public entities. The Gazette properly argued this point. 2 32 Both entities
were established by the Court and are under its direct supervision. 23 3 As
part of the attorney regulatory regime in Montana, both entities are an ex224. Id. at 1130.

225. Id.; R. Law. Disc. Enforcement 20(a).
226. R. Law. Disc. Enforcement 26.
227. Marbury v. Madison, I U.S. 137, 177 (1803).

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Mont.
Br. of
Mont.
Mont.
Br. of

Const. art 1I, § 9.
Appellant at 1, Billings Gaz.., 190 P.3d 1126.
Code Ann. § 2-6-101(3)(b) (2007).
Const. art II, § 9.
Appellant at 7-8, Billings Gaz., 190 P.3d 1126.

233. Tim Strauch, Busy Beginning for Discipline Counsel, 28 Mont. Law. Rev. 10, 10 (Apr. 2003).
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tension of the Court. Therefore, the ODC and Commission should be subject to the public records provision of Montana's Constitution.
Because the ODC and Commission are public bodies, by statute, their
written records are deemed public. Montana Code Annotated Section
2-6-101(2)(a) defines a public writing as "the written acts or records of the
acts of sovereign authority, of official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, legislative, judicial, and executive ... except records that are constitutionally protected against disclosure." 2 34 Here, the documents at issue
were the disciplinary records of a public official. Those documents were
held by a public body. Absent a compelling privacy interest outweighing
the benefits of disclosure, the Court should have made Ms. D'Alton's file
public.
The policy reasons for keeping the proceedings confidential until guilt
is established are sound. This ensures a lawyer's reputation will not be
tarnished by frivolous claims. But, once the hurdle of proving malpractice
has been met, there remains no justification for confidentiality. The public
deserves a reasoned explanation as to why attorneys in Montana can admit
2 35
their guilt in confidence when a high school teacher, for instance, cannot.
Different and seemingly preferential treatment for lawyers adds to the
public's already-grim perception of the legal profession. Ms. D'Alton was
engaged in professional misconduct in her official capacity as a Billings
Deputy City Attorney and was compensated with public tax dollars. The
public is entitled to know the particulars of her misconduct.
-Helia Jazayeri
VII.

IN

RE MARRIAGE OF HARDIN

236

In In re Marriage of Hardin, the Montana Supreme Court held that a
party is not always entitled to a continuance of trial in a divorce proceeding
when his attorney withdraws on the first day of trial. 237
More specifically, the Court held that the party opposing the unrepresented party need not comply with the written notice requirement in Montana Code Annotated Section 37-61-405 and Montana Uniform District
Court Rule 10 ("Rule 10") when: (1) the unrepresented party consents to his
attorney's withdrawal by way of discharge shortly before trial; (2) the un234. Mont. Code Ann. § 2-6-101(2)(a) (emphasis added).
235. In re Petition of Billings High Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Billings Gaz., 149 P.3d 565 (Mont. 2006).

Here, the Court held high school teachers "have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their conduct as
public employees and-even if they did have a reasonable expectation of privacy-the privacy expectation did not clearly exceed the merits of public disclosure." Id. at 571.
236. In re Marriage of Hardin, 184 P.3d 1012 (Mont. 2008).
237. Id. at 1013, 1017.
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represented party has actual notice of the proceeding; (3) the court accommodates the unrepresented party by granting a reasonable amount of time to
obtain new counsel; and (4) the unrepresented party fails to obtain new
counsel within the time allotted by the court. 238
In support of this holding, the Court pointed out that the policy behind
the written notice requirement is to ensure a party is not abandoned and left
to fend for himself in the midst of trial. 239 Because the unrepresented party
consented to his attorney's withdrawal as counsel, the party in essence
chose to go to trial unrepresented and was "abandoned" solely because he
decided to discharge his attorney days before trial. 240
On May 3, 2004, Michael Hardin petitioned for dissolution of his marriage in the Eighteenth Judicial District Court. 241 The proceedings were
postponed for nearly two and a half years after the petition, but the trial date
was finally set for September 20, 2006.242 Michael discharged his attorney
(McKenna) on September 6, 2006, only two weeks before trial. 243 Michael
justified this discharge by claiming McKenna failed both to provide him
certain documents and to file motions of contempt against Michael's wife
Tania. 244 Within eight days of the discharge, McKenna filed a notice with
the district court of his intent to withdraw. 245 He informed the court that he
mailed Michael a consent form, but he had not yet heard back. 246 On September 20, 2006-the first day of trial-McKenna moved to withdraw from
representing Michael because Michael had fired him. 247 The district court
granted McKenna's motion, but it refused to grant Michael's motion to delay trial so he could find representation. 248 In denying Michael's motion,
the court attempted to accommodate Michael by forcing McKenna to stay
on as stand-by counsel; however, Michael declined the accommodation. 249
The district court then allowed Tania's attorney to question Tania and
enter the uncontested facts on the record.250 Although allowed to participate, Michael refused because he felt prejudiced, commenting that he was
not "going to act like" an attorney.2 5 1 The district court recessed the trial
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Id. at 1016-1017.
Id. at 1016.
Id.
Id. at 1013.
In re Marriage of Hardin, 184 P.3d at 1013.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re Marriage of Hardin, 184 P.3d at 1013.
Id.
Id. at 1014.
Id.
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early and allowed Michael to search for an attorney for the rest of the
2 52
day.
Michael returned the next day without an attorney. 25 3 He had spoken
to several attorneys, but all refused to take his case. 2 54 Michael requested a
continuance, and again the district court denied his request. 2 55 The district
court supported this decision by the facts that (1) the case had already been
continued numerous times, (2) the trial date had been set for "a length of
time," and (3) the case needed resolution because it affected not only
Michael and Tania-but also their children. 25 6 The trial proceeded with
Michael objecting to the entire proceeding. 25 7 After the trial concluded, the
district court accommodated Michael by giving him an additional thirty
258
days to find a new attorney and file a notice of appearance with the court.
The court specifically warned Michael that if he did not find an attorney
within a reasonable amount of time, it would render a judgment based on

the record before

it.259

More than fifty days later, Michael's new attorney filed a notice of
appearance. 260 Neither Michael nor his attorney filed any additional motions or presented any evidence to the district court after that filing. 26 1 Consequently, the district court issued its decree of dissolution on December 26,
2006.262

Michael appealed that order. 263

On appeal, Michael relied on Quantum Electric, Inc. v. Schaeffer, arguing the case supported his contention that he was entitled to the written
notice requirement in Montana Code Annotated Section 37-61-405 and
Rule 10.264 The majority, however, held that Quantum Electric was distin252. Id.
253. Id.
254. In re Marriage of Hardin, 184 P.3d at 1014.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. In re Marriage of Hardin, 184 P.3d at 1014.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 1015 (citing Quantum Electric, Inc. v. Schaeffer, 64 P.3d 1026 (Mont. 2003)); Mont.
Code Ann. § 37-61-405 (2007) ("When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended or ceases to act as
such, a party to an action for whom he was acting as attorney must, before any further proceedings are
had against him, be required by the adverse party, by written notice, to appoint another attorney or
appear in person."); Mont. Unif. Dist. Ct. R. 10(b)(1)-(3), (d) ("When the attorney representing a party
to an action or proceeding dies, is removed, withdraws, or ceases to act as such, that party, before any
further proceedings are had against him must be given notice by any adverse party: (1) That such party
must appoint another attorney or appear in person, and (2) The date of the trial or of the next hearing or
action required in the case, and (3) That if he fails to appoint an attorney or appear in person by a date
certain, which may not be less than twenty days from the date of the notice, the action or other proceed-
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guishable from the present case because Quantum Electric presupposes that
the proceedings will not begin for twenty or more days in the future, which
allows the proceeding to be stayed or rescheduled.2 65 Based on this distinction, the Court concluded that Quantum Electric was inapplicable and did
not relate to the scenario faced in the present case-counsel withdrawing
266
during trial.
Because Michael was physically in the courtroom at the time of the
proceeding, the Court concluded that giving Michael notice of the proceeding was unnecessary. 26 7 Not only did Michael have actual notice of the
proceeding, but he was unrepresented only because he chose to discharge
his attorney right before trial. 268 The Court concluded that a strict application of Quantum Electric would allow Michael to discharge his attorney on

the first day of every re-scheduled trial in order to postpone a trial.269 Such
an application would be absurd and would negatively affect judicial economy. 2 70 The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of
a continuance but included a strong dissent from Justice Nelson-the author
27 1
of Quantum Electric.
Justice Nelson argued that the district court's accommodations to
Michael were simply "illusory,- and as such, Michael was entitled to a written notice and continuance pursuant to Montana Code Annotated Section
37-61-405 and Rule 10.272 The accommodations were illusory because
Michael only received thirty days to find a new attorney "after the trial had
ended." 2 73 Entering a contested battle midway through trial without adequate preparation, "or, even worse, try[ing] to salvage a case after the trial
2 74
is over and the damage has been done," begs a malpractice claim.
Moreover, Justice Nelson argued that the language of Montana Code
Annotated Section 37-61-405 and Rule 10 unambiguously require written
notice to an unrepresented party whenever that party's attorney "is removed" or "ceases to act" in his representative capacity, without exception. 275 Moreover, there is no rule prohibiting a party from discharging his
ing will proceed and may result in a judgment or other order being entered against him, by default or
ithin twenty days
otherwise.... (d) If said party does not appoint another attorney or appear in person wx
of the service or mailing of said notice, the action may proceed to judgment
265. Id. at 1016.
266. In re Marriageof Hardin, 184 P.3d at 1016.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 1017.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. In re Marriage of Hardin, 184 P.3d at 1017 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
273. Id. (emphasis in original).
274. Id.
275. Id.
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attorney right before trial, nor is there any language limiting the notice requirements in such a situation. 276 Indeed, Montana courts have a long history of strictly enforcing the plain language of Montana Code Annotated
Section 37-61-405 and Rule 10, and to prove it, Justice Nelson cited a
277
number of cases.
Two policy arguments support Justice Nelson's argument. First,
courts favor deciding cases on the merits. 278 Second, the small burden of
extending the proceedings another twenty days and requiring opposing
counsel to serve written notice on an unrepresented party is insignificant
compared to the potential prejudice suffered by a client forced to proceed
without the aid of an attorney. 279 According to Justice Nelson, the majority's holding-creating time and "intention" requirements-does nothing
more than (1) muddle up firmly established precedent, (2) encourage arguments by attorneys that ignore the law, and (3) increase the number of ap280
peals burdening an already over-worked court.
On the other hand, Justice Cotter concurred, seeking to rectify whether
the majority or dissent properly applied Quantum Electric.281 She concluded that the majority's application of Quantum Electric was correct and
its holding proper. 282 Cotter relied on McPartlin v. Fransen, a Montana
283
Supreme Court case cited in Quantum Electric.

In McPartlin, the Court held that the purpose behind the requirement is
to notify a party who would not otherwise know of the upcoming proceeding absent the notice. 284 As Justice Cotter points out, McPartlin speaks
specifically to an "eleventh hour" withdrawal by counsel: "[T]he over-riding purpose of our statute is to impose some duty on the opposing party to
notify if he determines such party is, without his consent, no longer represented by counsel." 285 Written notice, therefore, must be issued when the
withdrawal occurs because of an action taken by counsel without the cli286
ent's consent, as in Quantum Electric and McPartlin.

276. Id. at 1017.
277. Id. at 1017-1018 (citing Endresse v. Van Vleet, 169 P.2d 719 (Mont. 1946); McPartlin v.
Fransen, 582 P.2d 1255 (Mont. 1978); In re Marriage of Whiting, 854 P.2d 343 (Mont. 1993); In re
Marriage of Neneman, 703 P.2d 164 (Mont. 1985); Mont. Bank v. Benson, 717 P.2d 6 (Mont. 1986);
Stanley v. Holms, 934 P.2d 196 (Mont. 1997)).
278. Inre Marriage of Hardin, 184 P.3d at 1018 (citing Quantum Electric, Inc. v.Schaeffer,64 P.3d
1026 (Mont. 2003)); see also Maulding v. Hardman, 847 P.2d 292 (Mont. 1993).
279. Id.
280. Id. at 1019.
281. Id.
282. Id.at 1020-1021.
283. Id.at 1020.
284. In re Marriage of Hardin, 184 P.3d at 1020.
285. Id.(citing McPartlin, 582 P.2d at 1259) (emphasis added).
286. Id.
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That notice is not required, however, when "the client having full
knowledge of the impending trial date fires his attorney just before the trial
'287
is to commence.
-Aaron Neilson
VIII.

MoDRoo v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY28 8

In Modroo, the Montana Supreme Court enforced a choice-of-law provision in a personal automobile insurance policy-even though application
of the chosen law gave force to anti-stacking 289 and offset provisions that
are likely contrary to Montana public policy. 290
The central issue in Modroo was the amount of insurance coverage
available to the estate and family of Mamie Hardy, who was killed in a
single-vehicle automobile accident in Mineral County, Montana, on February 15, 2003.291 At the time of her death, Hardy was an Ohio resident
attending the University of Montana. 292 Mary Modroo, Hardy's mother and
personal representative of her estate, collected the $50,000 policy limit
from Allstate Insurance Company, who insured the driver of the vehicle in
which Hardy was killed. 293 Modroo then filed suit against Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company, Nationwide Agribusiness Insurance Company, and Farmland Mutual Insurance Company (collectively Nationwide),
294
her underinsured motorist (UIM) carriers.
Modroo sought UIM coverage from Nationwide under both a commercial and personal automobile policy. 295 The Nationwide commercial policy
provided a UIM limit of $1,000,000 per accident. 296 The personal policy
insured two vehicles and provided UIM coverage limits of $300,000 per
person. 297 Both policies originated in Ohio and expressly provided that
Ohio contract law would govern their interpretation. 298 Both policies also
287. Id. at 1021.
288. Modroo v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 191 P.3d 389 (Mont. 2008).
289. "Anti-stacking provisions violate Montana public policy if they allow an insurer to charge separate premiums for multiple underinsured motorist (UIM) coverages but limit the amount an insured may
recover to the limits available under a single UIM coverage." Id. at 403. These provisions are viewed
as beyond the reasonable expectations of the insured; therefore, insureds are entitled to stack the number
of UIM premiums he or she pays. Id.
290. Id. at 402.
291. Id. at 393.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Modroo, 191 P.3d at 393.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 394.
298. Id.
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contained anti-stacking language and mandated that the UIM limits be offset by any payments made by a legally responsible party. 29 9 Despite the
policies' directive, Modroo sought a ruling that the contract should be interpreted under Montana law and the anti-stacking and offset provisions de300
clared void.
Following cross motions for partial summary judgment, the trial court
conducted a conflict-of-law analysis and determined that Ohio law should
be used to interpret the policies. 30 ' Accordingly, it ruled that while Modroo
was entitled to UIM coverage under the Nationwide personal policy, she
could not stack the UIM limits, and Nationwide was entitled to any available offsets. 30 2 The trial court also found that Modroo was not entitled to
UIM coverage under the Nationwide commercial policy because the named
insured was a partnership; 3 03 "thus, no coverage extended to Mamie under
30 5
the . . policy." 3 °4 Modroo appealed these findings.
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court first dealt with the district
court's denial of UIM coverage under the commercial policy. The Court
found a discrepancy between the policy's named insured block, which listed
the individual members of the partnership, and the form of business language that indicated the insured was a partnership. 30 6 The Court held this
discrepancy created an ambiguity in the policy, and the ambiguity must be
"construed against the insurer and in favor of extending coverage." 30 7 Accordingly, the Court found that Modroo was a named insured under the
commercial policy and the UIM coverage extended to Hardy as a "family
30 8
member" of a named insured.
After disposing of the coverage issue under the commercial policy, the
Court turned its attention to the most controversial issue on appeal: Whether
the district court was correct in interpreting the Nationwide personal policy
under Ohio contract law, thereby enforcing its anti-stacking and offset pro299. Id. at 393-394.
300. Modroo, 191 P.3d at 394.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. The commercial policy was issued to "CASSIUS H & MARY J HARDY & HARRY
MODROO DBA MODROO FARM." hi. at 393. The declaration page of the policy also contained the
language "FORM OF BUSINESS: PARTNERSHIP." Id.
304. Id. at 394. It was important for the Court to determine whether the named insured was an
individual or a partnership. If the named insured was an individual, coverage would extend to the
named insured and the named insured's family members; conversely, if the named insured was a partnership, coverage only extended to those occupying the insured vehicle (which was not in the accident).
Id. at 395.
305. Id. at 394.
306. Modroo, 191 P.3d at 394.
307. Id. at 397.
308. Id.
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visions. '" Interestingly, Modroo did not directly appeal the lower court's

decision to apply Ohio law- rather, she claimed the policy's choice-of-law
provision was ambiguous, and Ohio law therefore called for application of
the state law that most favored the insured. 3 10 Alternatively, Modroo argued Ohio contract law should not apply because the resulting interpretation offended Montana's public policy prohibiting offset and anti-stacking
pros isions?'
The Court quickly rejected Modroo's mgument that the choice-of-law
provision in the personal policy was ambiguous. The subject language obligated Nationwide to pay the damages that an insured was "'legally entitled
to rcco\ cr from the owner or driv er of an underinsured motor vehicle under
the tort law of the state where the motor vehicle accident occurred. ' ' 3 12 The
policy further pro\ ided that 'contract law of the State of Ohio governs the
interpretation of this contract. " 3 The Court determined that, when read
together, the clauses clearly stated Montana tort law and Ohio contract law
\would gover an dispute.3 1 4 Because "the amount of coverage available
under a ULINI provision is defined under principles of contract law, not tort
3 5
law." Ohio contract law \\as implicated by Modroo's claim.
Next, the Court addressed Nlodroo's public policy argument. The
Court characteri/ed Nlodroo's argument as a challenge to the effectilVeness
ot the parties' choice-of-law agrecm ent, and pros ided the follow ing test
friom the Restatement (Sccond) of Conflict olLi's § 187(2)(b) to determine
the validity of the agreement:
t Iactors are
W\Vwill not apptN the law of the state chosen by the parties i"three
but for the choice-of-la\\ provision. Montana ta\\ would appy
met: (I) it'.
under § 188 of the Re sttement: 2) itNlontana has a materiall\ orcatcr intercst in the particular issue than the state chosen li\the parties: and (3) if applyil, the state law chosen by the partics would contra\ ene a fundamental polic.
3
of Montana. Io

The Court proceeded to strictl appl\ each factor of the conjunctive test.
Section 188 of the Restatement provides that, absent an effective choice of
I'aw, contlact interpretation issues should be resolved b the law of the state
that has the "most significant relationship" to the parties and the transaction. 7 The Resta t,'ement further provides that a court will follow the 'statW0O, ht,
31t0.
hi.

12

J1.ai. 3 08.
11odoo, 1' 1lP 3d at3')8

313. Id,
1t4. Id. mu301
15

hi.

§ ISS (10 I).
317, Res tat en t I S,'')nd) of ( oiht of Lo '.,
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utory directive of its own state on choice of law."' 3t 8 Montana law mandates that the law of the place of performance shall be used in contract
interpretation. 31 9 The Court reasoned that since the insurance policy contemplated performance in Montana, and since Hardy lived in Montana,
worked in Montana, paid taxes in Montana, was injured in Montana, and
incurred medical expenses in Montana, Montana law would apply under
Restatement Section 188.320
Although the Court determined that Montana had the most significant
relationship to the dispute under Section 188, it refused to find that Montana had a materially greater interest in the dispute than Ohio. 3 2 1 The Court
accorded weight to five factors from the Restatement Section 188(2) to balance the respective interests of Montana and Ohio: "(1) the place of contracting; (2) the place of negotiation of the contract; (3) the place of performance; (4) the location of the subject matter of the contract; and (5) the
domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties. ' 322 After determining that the place of performance
carries little weight when it is uncertain or unknown at the time of contracting (as it was in this instance), and the remaining contacts were neutral
or favored application of Ohio law, the majority concluded Montana did not
have a "materially greater interest that would warrant applying Montana
323
law over the parties express choice" for Ohio law.
Upon concluding Montana did not possess the requisite interest in the
matter to justify applying Montana law, the majority refused to reach the
issue of whether or not application of Ohio law would violate Montana's
324
public policy.
In her dissent, Justice Cotter challenged the majority's "reflexive and
rote" application of the Restatement factors. 325 She argued that the majority
erred by construing the Restatement language too strictly and advocated for
a more holistic application of the Restatement factors to balance the interests of the individual states. 32 6 The dissent further argued that Ohio's interest in the dispute was limited to the state's general need to protect the justified expectations of the insurer. 327 Montana's materially greater interest, on
318. Id. at § 6.
319. Mont. Code Ann. § 28-3-102 (2007).
320. Modroo, 191 P.3d at 401.
321. Id. at 402.
322. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 188(2).
323. Modroo, 191 P.3d at 402.
324. Id. However, the majority did suggest in dicta that it was unlikely that the policy language was
contrary to Modroo's reasonable expectations because it only charged a single premium for UIM coverage. Id. at 403.
325. Id. at 407 (Cotter, J., dissenting).
326. Id. at 408.
327. Id.
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the other hand, was protecting the reasonable expectations of the named
insured who was attending a Montana university, paying taxes in Montana,
and was protected by the laws and constitution of the state. 328 The dissent
concluded by cautioning that a mechanical application of the Restatement
factors would overlook important public policy concerns and give rise to a
situation where "Montana's interest [could] be trumped by foreign insurers
3 29
at the stroke of a pen.."
Modroo displays the Court's reluctance to invalidate UIM anti-stacking and offset provisions in favor of Montana public policy. The distinct
difference between Modroo and factually similar situations where the Court
has voided such provisions is the express choice-of-law provision in the
Nationwide policy. 330 On its face, Modroo suggests an out-of-state insurer
may circumvent Montana's public policy favoring stacking of UIM coverage for accidents occurring within state boundaries by placing a choice-oflaw provision in all policies issued to customers residing outside the state.
-Ross
IX.

Sharkey

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY V. WAGNER-ELLSWORTH

33

In Allstate Insurance Company v. Wagner-Ellsworth, the Montana Supreme Court held that an insurance policy defining "bodily injury" as
"physical harm to the body, sickness, disease, or death," includes "mental
injuries with physical manifestations." 332 The Court overruled Jacobson v.
333
Farmers Union Mutual Insurance Company.
In light of this holding, third party actions, such as negligent infliction
of emotional distress, may be compensated under an automobile insurance
policy. 3 34 Further, because emotional distress is included as bodily injury
under the policy, claimants are not limited to recovery of the "each person"
policy limit.3 35 If two individuals have suffered "bodily injury" because of
328. Id. The dissent goes on to note that anti-stacking provisions violate Montana public policy as a
"matter of constitutional principle." Id. at 410. Such principles are of far greater import than the self
interest of a national insurer. Id.
329. Modroo, 191 P.3d at 410 (Cotter, J., dissenting).
330. See e.g. Wamslev v. Nodak Mutual Ins. Co., 178 P.3d 102 (Mont. 2008) (invalidating a UIM
anti-stacking provision in coverages issued by a North Dakota insurer to a North Dakota insured where
accident occurred in Montana and policy did not contain a choice-of-law provision); Mitchell v. State
Farm Ins. Co., 68 P.3d 703 (Mont. 2003) (applying Montana law to allow stacking of UIM coverages
issued by national insurer to California insureds where injurious accident occurred in Montana and
policy did not contain choice-of-law provision).
331. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wagner-Ellsworth, 188 P.3d 1042 (Mont. 2008).
332. Id. at 1051.
333. Id. (overruling Jacobson v. Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co., 87 P.3d 995 (Mont. 2004)).
334. Id.
335. Id. at 1048.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2009

31

Montana Law Review, Vol. 70 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 7

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 70

an accident, claimants may recover up to the "each accident" or "each oc336
currence" policy limit listed on the declarations page.
On February 22, 2000, Terry Wagner-Ellsworth's vehicle struck Matthew Rusk as he crossed the street in front of his elementary school. 337
Brandon, Matthew's brother, was with him and saw the collision. 33 8 Tiffany Rusk, their mother, arrived immediately after the accident to pick up
her sons from school. She was unaware of the incident until she saw her
son lying in the street. 3 39 Matthew was hospitalized and suffered severe
340
trauma.
Under Wagner-Ellsworth's Allstate automobile policy, Matthew received $50,000 for his injuries-the policy's per-person limit for liability. 34 ' Tiffany, on behalf of herself and Brandon, filed an action against
Wagner-Ellsworth. 34 2 Tiffany contended that both Brandon and she suffered emotional and physical injuries when Matthew was struck because
Brandon saw his brother hit by the car, and Tiffany, without warning, saw
her son lying injured in the street. 34 3 Both Tiffany and Brandon suffered
emotional injuries, which had physical manifestations. 344 Brandon suffered
shock and fright, which lead to physical symptoms, and Tiffany suffered
physical pain as well as migraines and elevated heart beat whenever she
34 5
heard sirens.
Allstate filed a declaratory action seeking adjudication relieving its obligation to either indemnify or defend the action against Wagner-Ellsworth
for Tiffany or Brandon's claims. 346 The district court followed Jacobson
where the Court held that emotional injuries suffered by the plaintiffthough accompanied by physical manifestations-were not bodily injury
347
under the policy.
The Montana Supreme Court, however, accepted Tiffany's invitation
to revisit the holding in Jacobson, which it found to be "manifestly
wrong." 348 Bodily injury, when defined broadly as in the Allstate policy,
336. Id.
337. Wagner-Ellsworth, 188 P.3d at 1044.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Wagner-Ellsworth, 188 P.3d at 1044.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 1044, 1048.
346. Id. at 1044.
347. Id. at 1045.
348. Id.at 1051.
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does include emotional distress when accompanied by physical manifesta34 9
tions.
The Jacobson Court erred in following Aetna Casualty and Surety
Company v. First Security Bank of Bozeman. 35 0 In Aetna, a federal district
court interpreted Montana law, without the benefit of allowing the Montana
Supreme Court to decide such an issue, and held bodily injury did not include emotional distress in an insurance policy. 3 5' The Wagner-Ellsworth
Court, after a thorough and comprehensive investigation of the authority
relied upon by the federal district judge in Aetna, found the Jacobson Court
erred in following such precedent; 352 none of the cases cited in Aetna involved emotional distress coupled with physical symptoms or manifestations. 353 The Court stated that "reliance on Aetna may well have led the
Jacobson Court to overlook [the] later development in the law which addressed the distinction between" emotional injuries that are accompanied
354
by, or lack, a physical element.
The Court looked to sister jurisdictions and identified a "clear development in the law which distinguished mental injuries from mental injuries
with physical manifestations." 355 This investigation provided insight as to
what counts as a physical manifestation because the Court acknowledged
"distinguishing between injuries which have physical manifestations from
those which do not can be challenging. '3 56 In Trinh v. Allstate, the Washington Court of Appeals found headaches, nausea, and hair and weight loss
that accompanied the emotional distress suffered after witnessing her
friend's death to be "physical manifestations.." 357 Further, the requisite
physical element is satisfied by dry throat, rise in body temperature, and a
knot in the stomach, as well as high blood pressure, sleep loss, stomach
358
pains and muscle aches.
The definition of physical manifestation is not all-encompassing, however. The Court cited cases holding "bodily injury does not encompass
damages for humiliation, mental anguish and mental suffering." 359 Also,
"crying, shaking and sleep difficulties are not enough." 360 The Court
349. Wagner-Ellsworth, 188 P.3d at 1049.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Wagner-Ellsworth, 188 P.3d at 1050.
356. Id. at 1051.
357. Id. at 1050.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 1052 (citing Farm Bureau Mut. his. Co. of Mich. v. Hoag, 356 N.W.2d 630, 633 (Mich.
App. 1984)).
360. Id. (citing Econ. Preferred Ins. Co. v.Jia, 92 P.3d 1280, 1284 (N.M. App. 2004)).
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stated, "When an emotional distress claim is not supported factually, the
insurer can and should move to dismiss the meritless claims," and "each
case must necessarily be judged by its own facts to determine whether the
alleged injuries are sufficiently akin to physical injuries to fall within cover-

age for 'bodily injury.'

"361

When a third party has suffered sufficient physical manifestations of
emotional distress, a claim under the insured's policy is not limited to the
"per person" coverage. 362 The insured's "per occurrence" or "per accident"
limitations are available to satisfy both the claims of the insured injured in
the accident and any other insured who has suffered emotional distress ac36 3
companied by physical manifestations.
-Justin Stalpes
3 64

X.

STATE V. GOETZ

In State '. Goetz, the Montana Supreme Court took an affirmative step
towards protecting Montanans' constitutional rights by holding that the
State can no longer monitor or record conversations in a criminal investigation without a warrant or warrant exception. 3 65 The Goetz majority expressed that monitoring and recording of conversations, even if one of the
parties consents, violates Montana's constitutional right to privacy and right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 36 6 The opinion explicitly overruled the Court's twenty-year precedent that electronic monitoring
367
and recording of a conversation does not require a warrant.
This case arose as the result of similar incidents involving two different defendants. 368 In the first, a detective with the Missouri River Drug
Task Force wired a confidential informant before she purchased
methamphetamine from Michael Goetz. 369 Unbeknownst to Goetz, officers
recorded and monitored his conversations with the confidential informant
through use of a body wire. 370 In the second incident, officers recorded and
monitored Joseph Hamper's conversations with a confidential informant as
he sold the informant marijuana. 37 ' Goetz's conversation took place inside
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.

Wagner-Ellsworth, 188 P.3d at 1052.
Id.at 1047-1048.
Id.
Mont. v. Goetz, 191 P.3d 489 (Mont. 2008).
Id.at 504; Mont. Const. art. II, §§ 10-11.
Mont. Const. art. II, §§ 10-11.
Mont. v. Brown, 755 P.2d 1364, 1368 (Mont. 1988).
Goetz, 191 P.3d at 492.

369. Id. at 492-493.
370. Id.
371. Id.at 493.
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his house, whereas Hamper's took place both inside his home and in a vehicle. 372 In neither case, however, did investigators seek or obtain a search
warrant.

373

Both Goetz and Hamper were charged with drug-related counts as a
result of their monitored and recorded conversations with the confidential
informants. 374 Both defendants moved, unsuccessfully, to suppress the evidence based on their right to privacy and right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures, as guaranteed by Article II, Sections 10 and 11 of the
Montana Constitution. 375 Goetz and Hamper were convicted, and both ap376
pealed to the Montana Supreme Court.
The admissibility of monitored and recorded conversations is by no
377
means a matter of first impression for either Montana or federal courts.
In 1971, the U.S. Supreme Court held that electronic monitoring and recording of face-to-face conversations-with the consent of one of the parties-did not constitute a search and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 378 Montana, though, does not "march lock-step" 37 9 with federal
courts on constitutional issues and has repeatedly recognized that its constitution affords greater protection from searches and seizures than the U.S.
Constitution. 380 In fact, in 1984, the Montana Supreme Court held that
warrantless electronic monitoring and recording of conversations with an
undercover law enforcement officer violated Article 1I, Sections 10 and 11
of the Montana Constitution, which provide individuals with a right to privacy and protection from unreasonable searches and seizures. 381 Four years
later, though, and consistent with federal jurisprudence, the Court held that
monitoring and recording does not constitute a search when one party to the
conversation (e.g., an undercover officer or informant) consents to the monitoring and recording. 382 With Goetz, the Court took the opportunity to reexamine these prior holdings in light of its historical protectionist posture
towards the right to privacy and right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures.
As it has in other search and seizure cases, the majority applied a
three-prong framework in analyzing the constitutionality of the monitoring
372
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.

Id. at 492-493.
Id.
Goetz, 191 P.3d at 493.
Id.
Id.
See e.g. Mont. v. Solis, 693 P.2d 518 (Mont. 1984); Brown, 755 P.2d 1364; U.S. v. White, 401

U.S. 745 (1971).
378. White, 401 U.S. at 754.
379. Mont. v. Bullock, 901 P.2d 61, 75 (Mont. 1995) (citations omitted).
380. Id. (citations omitted).
381. Solis, 693 P.2d at 522.
382. Brown, 755 P.2d at 1368.
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and recording. 3 83 The first two prongs are directed at determining whether
a search or seizure occurred in light of the right to privacy articulated in
Article 1I, Section 10 of the Montana Constitution. The first prong requires
the Court to determine "whether the person challenging the state's action
has an actual subjective expectation of privacy.1 384 Under the second
prong, the Court must determine "whether society is willing to recognize
that subjective expectation as objectively reasonable." 385 The state's intrusion is a search or seizure if the person had the actual subjective expectation
of privacy, and society is willing to recognize that expectation as objec386
tively reasonable.
The third prong of the search and seizure analysis is aimed at determining whether the search or seizure was reasonable, as required by Article
II, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution. 38 7 In making this analysis, the
Court looks to the "nature of the state's intrusion." 388 If the intrusion is a
search, it must be in furtherance of "a compelling state interest" and, generally, must be accompanied by a search warrant or warrant exception. 389 In
the absence of a compelling state interest and a search warrant or warrant
390
exception, the search is per se unreasonable.
Applying the analytical framework to the facts of Goetz and Hamper,
the majority found the monitoring and recording of their conversations violated their right to privacy and right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures. Of paramount importance to the majority was that the conversations in question took place in "private" settings. 39 1 Under the first prong
of the framework, the majority concluded that both Goetz, in his house, and
Hamper, in a house and in a private vehicle, had actual, subjective expecta39 2
tions of privacy in their conversations with the informants.
In examining the facts under the second prong, the majority concluded
society was willing to recognize their expectations of privacy as reasonable. 393 Constitutional protections, the Court noted, "extend to all of Montana's citizens including those suspected of a criminal act or charged with
one." 3 94 The majority reasoned that protections against eavesdropping and
electronic surveillance were intrusions that members of the 1972 Montana
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Constitutional Convention specifically sought to prevent in the absence of a
warrant. 'llThe majority reasoned these clear expressions were evidence
that society recognizes protection from electronic monitoring and recording
39 1,
in-person conversations.
In short, Goetz and Hamper had been searched when their conversations with the informants were monitored and recorded.'"7 But, were those
searches unreasonable? The majority answered this question by analyzing
the third prong of the framework-the nature of the state's intrusion. 39X
While there might have been a compelling state interest to record the conversations with Goctz and Hamper, the state did not obtain a search warrant
before doing So.3911 In the absence of a warrant exception, then, the
searches were per se unreasonable and violated Article I, Section 10 of the
Montana Constitution.I()")
The state arIued there were two warrant exceptions that applied to
electronic monitoring and recording of in-person conversations. 4t I First,
consistent with the Court's prior holding, the state maintained a warrant
was not required where one of the parties to the conversation (i.e., the informant) consented to the monitoring and recording.102 The majority summarily overruled that prior holding and expressed that all parties to a conversation must consent to monitoring and recording before the exception
could apply. 4 3 The majority analogized this principle to that of premises
searches, where all occupants of a premise who are present when a search is
requested must consent before the search can be performed without a war4

rant. 04

Second, the state argued the searches should only have been subject to
a "particularized suspicion" standard rather than a "probable cause" stan4 16
dard.4 05 If this were true, a search warrant would not have been required.
For only "minimally intrusive" invasions, the state should not have to meet
the required probable cause standard before a search warrant will be issued. 4 7 As a result, the state argued, these types of searches should not
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require a warrant. 40 8 The majority rejected this argument because, unlike
other scenarios where a particularized suspicion standard is appropriate, the
Goetz and Hamper searches "intruded into the sanctity" of homes and pri410
vate settings. 40 9 Neither of the conversations was exposed to the public.
For such invasions, the majority held, the state must establish probable
411
cause and obtain a warrant.
Having found that a search occurred without a warrant or warrant exception, the majority concluded the State violated Article II, Sections 10
and 11 of the Montana Constitution when it monitored and recorded the
Goetz and Hamper conversations. 412 The opinion was not unanimous,
though. Justices Nelson and Leaphart concurred, but believed the prohibition should apply to conversations in public settings, as well as private
ones. 413 Justices Morris, Rice, and Warner dissented.
The principle thrust of the dissents was two-fold. First, the dissenting
Justices maintained the majority's opinion violated the principle of stare
decisis by ignoring the Court's previous, controlling holding that the consent of one party obviated the need for a warrant when monitoring and
recording conversations. 414 Second, even if a warrant were required for
private conversations, the conversations involving Goetz and Hamper were
not private-they were commercial drug deals. 415 Justice Rice reasoned
that commercial transactions and conversations are not attended by the
same level of privacy that accompanies social conversations among friends
and family. 416 Thus, the conversations with Goetz and Hamper were not
searches and did not necessitate a search warrant. 417 For these reasons,
among others, the dissenting Justices believed the majority reached the
wrong conclusion.
Goetz explicitly overruled a twenty-year precedent by finding that
electronic monitoring and recording of private conversations constitute a
search and require a warrant, even if one of the parties consents. Whether it
be infrared sensors, drug dogs, or satellite photographs, technology undeniably plays an important role in modem criminal investigations. The Goetz
opinion highlights that the State must use those technologies in a provident
manner that is consistent with Montanan's constitutional rights. The Mon408. Id. at 502.
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tana practitioner should be aware of the potential intrusions that technology
brings with it. At least in terms of monitoring and recording private conversations, there is little doubt that the State should have a warrant in hand,
or a warrant exception in mind, if it intends to- offer those monitored and
recorded conversations as evidence in criminal cases.
-Randy

Tanner
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